The 2018 elections in Zimbabwe bear strong similarities to
those of 1980: the promise of a new beginning after almost two decades of
political strife, economic crisis and social decay; the numerical dominance of
youthful voters, a large proportion of whom are voting for the first time; and
the level of international engagement and scrutiny the likes of which have not
been experienced since 1980, represented as it is by almost 50 observer
missions, the plethora of media houses, journalists, spooks and fortune
hunters.
Significantly, it is an election that is taking place
against the backdrop of a coup (on November 15, 2017) which, in reality and
import, represented an advanced stage in the disintegration of a securocratic
state that has hitherto characterised the Zimbabwean polity for almost two
decades, a period during which opposition forces, so loud and inexorable on the
back of the growing political (and economic) misfortunes of a former liberation
movement that had lost its mass base ever since the 1990s, were stymied,
brutalised and bottled up like champagne ready to burst and froth.
And so it is that we have this Monday, 30th July, 2018, the
old and young, almost literally face-to-face in a duel between, on the one
hand, the representative of an all but spent force that is the Zanu PF
party/state conflation and, on the other, a mere 40-year-old who has
nevertheless captured the imagination of the thousands that have thronged his
campaign rallies across the country.
Under normal circumstances, it would be difficult to
imagine how a presidential candidate like Emmerson Mnangagwa could hope to win
the poll: close to 80 in terms of age; a central and almost indispensable
factor in the Mugabe regime; one who since 1999, when he lost to John Nkomo in
the contest for national chairman in the Zanu PF congress that year, has
struggled ever since to garner the post of vice-president in Zanu PF, losing to
Joice Mujuru in 2004 and more recently in 2014, with that constant and consistent
statistic wherein, except for his home province the Midlands, the other nine
provinces rejected him; and, in the final event, only through a military coup
seven months ago, he has emerged the most unlikely — and yet no surprise given
the history of the securocrat state.
Therefore, in my considered view, it is less about the
prospects of Chamisa winning the presidential poll on Monday, even if by
default, than any hope that Mnangagwa could be a viable contender in a free,
fair and credible election.
Therefore, the prospects of a Government of National Unity
(GNU) are real, not in the expectation that a clean and fair contest will be
too close to call, but because of the likelihood of a disputed poll (given that
the conditions for a free, fair and credible election will not have been
fulfilled in the next three days), and the hope of a peaceful and smooth
transition out of the horrible past that has been the securocrat state in
Zimbabwe.
But this has to be a different GNU from the previous one of
2009-2013, in the following respects:
This is almost inevitable given the likely outcome that
Chamisa will be ahead of Mnangagwa in the poll, however close to call/or
manipulated in the final analysis.
Besides, how can a battered and divided Zanu PF (split as
it is between Lacoste, G40/NPF and Mujuru’s party) be expected to take the lead
in such a GNU? Also, it is the presidential poll, much more than the overall
result in the parliamentary elections, that will rule the day, not least when
all indications are that the latter will be a mixed bag in which no single
party might command a majority.
Accordingly, the new government should not only be led by
the MDC Alliance but also reflect, in character and direction, the new
dispensation in Zimbabwe. The government must include, necessarily, a lean
cabinet but infused with the requisite technocratic skills, especially in the
economic-related ministries and departments.
We need restoration of constitutionalism, the rule of law,
an accountable executive, vibrant legislature and a fiercely independent
judiciary.
So, in this regard, we expect, in the shortest period
possible, the full implementation of the 2013 constitution and such amendments
and improvements as will enhance the democratic process and limit the powers
and purview of the executive.
There also has to be a restoration of national institutions
as non-partisan, independent and efficient.
This includes, necessarily, a return to the barracks on the
part of the military and related security services, the restoration of a
professional army, police force and intelligence services. The letter and
spirit of the constitution should be the constant and consistent guide in this
regard.
Public sector reform and restructuring is also critical.
This is urgent given the obvious shortcomings of a public service plagued by
dead wood, ineffiency and wastefulness.
In this regard, there will be need to be established a
Reform Fund, to ensure a thoroughgoing and comprehensive public sector
restructuring, including the rationalisation and/or privatisation of the
loss-making public enterprises.
A commission of inquiry into corruption is needed,
especially but not exclusively in the extractive industry sector, for example
the US$15 billion diamond saga!
The establishment of a Peace and Reconciliation Commission
to deliberate upon and resolve issues attendant, not only to the pre- and
post-independence atrocities the main of which were the massacres at Mgagao
(1976), Chimoio, Nyadzonia, Victory Camp (and other Zapu centres in Zambia),
Entumbane, Gukurahundi, Murambatsvina and such political violence that
accompanied the elections since 2000, and especially during the 2008 run-off;
but also the internecine and intraparty scourges the main of which were the Chitepo
assassination and related killings in Zanu in 1975.
There has to be an economic and social recovery programme
on the back of debt relief and an accompanying economic reform programme that
targets poverty, revives the productive sectors and thereby creates employment
opportunities, attracts foreign investment whilst promoting indigenous
entrepreneurship, and attracting home a diaspora which accounts for almost 70%
of Zimbabwe’s professionals and skilled persons.
The mobilisation of international support to ensure both a
peaceful transition in Zimbabwe and a speedy economic and social recovery
programme (eg through a Reconstruction Fund to support the return of a viable
Zimbabwean currency and thereby put an end to the cash crisis, restore the
social sectors of education, health and service delivery across the country)
would be vital.
Whatever the outcome, the 30 July election represents the
hope and expectation of a fresh start for Zimbabwe. It marks the end of Zanu PF
which, as already been asserted, entered its final demise with the coup in
November 2017, itself the climax of years of internecine and intra-party/state
conflict; and heralds at least a generational change in Zimbabwe’s politics
and, hopefully, the beginnings of a new dispensation. Zimbabwe Independent
Mandaza is an academic, publisher and director of a local
think-tank, the Sapes Trust
0 comments:
Post a Comment